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Sulphur-Train Derailments in Canada


Ideas on what to do to attract more people that wish to live in Lamont County

The proposed sulphur storage facility envisioned to be constructed between Bruderheim and Lamont is a bad idea.


Sulphur-Train Derailments in Canada

Reports by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Report ID Date Incident and Location Synopsis Injuries
R94E0062 25 June 1994 Canadian National Railway Company
Derailment
CN Freight Train Number 716-23
at Mile 57.50, CN Camrose Subdivision
Duhamel, Alberta
A Canadian National Railway Company (CN) freight train proceeding southward on the CN Camrose Subdivision derailed the 33rd to the 55th cars from the locomotives as the train passed over the public crossing at Mile 57.5 near Duhamel, Alberta. There were no injuries. There was substantial damage to 1,350 feet of track. There were no injuries
R97V0063 26 March 1997 Derailment
Canadian National
Train No. Q-102-51-26
Mile 106.15, Ashcroft Subdivision
Conrad, British Columbia
At 0606 Pacific standard time on 26 March 1997, Canadian National train No. Q-102-51-26 (train 102), travelling from Boston Bar, British Columbia, to Kamloops, British Columbia, on the Ashcroft Subdivision encountered a large roadbed depression and derailed at Mile 106.15, near Conrad, British Columbia. Both crew members were fatally injured.

The Board determined that an extraordinary volume of surface water run-off from melting heavy snow cover and high seasonal precipitation was not captured and carried away as intended by the drainage system above the adjacent Trans-Canada Highway. The water soaked into the ground, migrated through the highway fills, and infiltrated and destabilized the railway subgrade. The railway subgrade could not sustain the resultant high pore pressure and collapsed. Contributing factors included the presence of moisture-sensitive alluvial deposits in the bottom area of the railway subgrade and the overlapping nature of the highway fills which created a contiguous groundwater flow path into the railway fills.

The locomotive engineer and the conductor were fatally injured.
R02E0114 04 December 2002

 
Main-Track Derailment
Canadian Pacific Railway
Train 614-046
Mile 11.8, Taber Subdivision
Bullshead, [about 8 miles west from Medicine Hat,]Alberta
At 0055 mountain standard time on 04 December 2002, eastward Canadian Pacific Railway freight train 614-046, proceeding toward Dunmore, Alberta, from Lethbridge, Alberta, derailed 42 loaded non-pressure tank cars of molten sulphur at Mile 11.8 of the Taber Subdivision, near Bullshead, Alberta. Ten tank cars were breached, spilling molten sulphur, which caught fire. Approximately 20 people were evacuated from farms near the accident site as a precaution due to the toxic nature of the smoke. There were no injuries.

[My Note: As of today, some of the owners of the farms that were evacuated are still trying to receive compensation for their losses.  Except for a case in which a private settlement took place, not a dime has been received by them so far, and the site restoration - contracted to HAZCO - is said to be far from satisfactory.  One of the land owners affected stated that HAZCO abandoned the reclamation effort. More details and photo at the bottom of this page]
There were no injuries. [That is according to the TSB report.  However, the landowner reports that her son has had since then frequent heavy nosebleeds that keep recurring.]
And in the news (from Canada and the world)
CN Locomotive History Index 23
August
1983
Loaded sulphur unit train struck loaded sulphur unit train standing on main track.

Kaybob, Alberta

On 23 Aug 1983, 5275 was the lead locomotive (5180 and 5269 trailing) on a loaded unit sulphur train coming out of Kaybob AB (Sangudo Sub) doing about 10 miles per hour. Rounding a curve in the dark at about 2200, the locomotive struck some other loaded sulphur cars on the main line. Result is shown in this photo taken the next morning. Complete details are in the book Hoghead. Unknown
  9
August
2002
locomotive struck the side of some liquid sulphur tank cars, knocking five of them off the rails,

Edmonton Alberta

A Lakeland and Waterways train using CN power collided with an east-bound CN train on a parallel track at the west end of Walker Yard in Edmonton. A crossover switch between the two tracks was lined to cross over, and the locomotive struck the side of some liquid sulphur tank cars, knocking five of them off the rails. Tim Husel, Lakeland and Waterways general manager, did not think the incident would ruin the good working relationship his company has built with CN. Lakeland and Waterways trains regularly operate in and out of CN's Walker Yards. Unknown
  26 November 2003 Canada, north of Quesnel, BC.
Five sulphur cars went off the tracks
A small quantity spilled and the BC Rail line was re-opened later the same day. Unknown
  18
February
2004
Khoransan Province, Iran Forty-eight freight cars (17 loaded with sulfur, 6 with gasoline, 7 with fertilizer, and 10 with cotton) derailed, burned and exploded.

See also Train explosion in Iran
460 people were injured and escaped with their lives, and 328 people died.
  1
September
2005
Canada Near Cheam View, Fraser Valley, British Columbia. CN. A Canadian National freight train, consisting of two locomotives and 97 cars, derailed. The train was loaded with dry sulphur. ... Unknown
  19
January
2009
USA, Littleton, Colorado
Freight train derailment
A Burlington Northern/Santa Fe 68-car freight train with 17 cars carrying liquid sulphur derailed in the centre of Littleton.  Three of the sulphur cars were punctured.  About 100 gal of the liquid sulphur leaked and started a number of small fires that were quickly put out. There were no injuries

Curiously, the Canadian incidents reported in the news didn't show up in the reports by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.  (Be that as it may, the blog of folc.ca contains a list (so far a very short one) of articles on derailments of sulphur-trains or sulphur-cars.  The list will be updated whenever folc.ca becomes aware of a news article on any sulphur train derailment.)

However, even more curiously, the group of reports at the Transportation Safety Board of Canada relating to pipeline incidents did not include a single report pertaining to problems or fires involving the transport of sulphur by pipeline.  Yet, the National Energy Board held a hearing October 2001 investigating specifically a series of problems affecting a sulphur pipeline owned and operated by Westcoast Energy Inc. near Hasler Flats (west of Chetwynd, North-Eastern B.C.), at the Pine River Gas Plant. 

The Pine River [BC] Gas Plant Sulpur Pipeline (sulphur pipeline) was designed to be 168 mm (6 inches) in diameter, 5.5 km (3.4 miles) in length, and to carry liquid sulphur from the sulphur recovery plant at the Pine River Gas Plant to a sulphur pelletizing plant. The pipeline was designed for a flow rate of 2000 tonnes/day with a maximum flow rate of 3000 tonnes/day....

Source: National Energy Board
Reasons for Decision
In the Matter of Westcoast Energy Inc.
Pine River Gas Plant - Sulphur Pipeline
MH-1-2001
October 2001, pp. 1, 4 - 7

Full Report (PDF file)

It is more interesting yet that in the report on the investigation by the National Energy Board a number of concerns were listed that needed to be addressed by Westcoast Energy Inc. before Westcoast was to be permitted to put their pipeline back into operation.  It so happens that all of those concerns are of the type of which HAZCO is persistently in denial.  Does that make one wonder whether it is HAZCO or the National Energy Board that knows more about the dangers of sulphur processing, handling and transporting?  Perhaps the issue is not so much how much the respective parties know but which of the parties is more forthright.

It should be noted that one of the conditions posed by the National Energy Board involves an issue with respect to which HAZCO persistently drags its feet, the matter of an emergency response plan.  Amongst other things, the report by the National Energy Board states this about an emergency response plan for the Pine River Gas Plant sulphur pipeline:

The basic elements of an emergency response plan include:

• general and site specific emergency response procedures;
• monitoring protocols to verify adherence to public evacuation and shelter criteria;
• a description and location of response equipment;
• an estimation of response times for different emergency scenarios;
• a procedure to establish and maintain liaison with all parties that may be involved in an emergency situation;
• a training plan;
• a communication plan; and
• a procedure to ensure that emergency response exercises and response activities from incidents are reviewed and incorporated into the emergency procedures manual, staff training, and continuing education programs.

While the SPERP contains these basic elements, the Board has identified the following three concerns:

• a discrepancy between the SPERP and FERP with respect to monitoring protocols to verify adherence to public evacuation and shelter criteria;
• training on the Incident Command System is a one time only requirement (see section 3.3.3) for each level; and
• the omission of a definite commitment to post incident follow-up.

Westcoast must clarify its monitoring protocols to ensure there is no short- or long-term risk to health or safety of individuals or the environment from the operation of the sulphur pipeline. Further, given the importance of training in the area of emergency response, Westcoast should develop and track an employee training program as discussed in Section 3.3.3.

The Board recommends that Westcoast, prior to restarting the pipeline, address the discrepancies between the Company’s SPERP and FERP regarding SO2 levels, monitoring protocols and the public evacuation and shelter criteria. Once clarified, these requirements need to be communicated to employees and the public. The Board further recommends that Westcoast review training requirements to identify those staff that require additional training to maintain a high level of emergency preparedness.

Source: ibid. pp. 16-17

It is well worth the effort it takes to read the whole report.  What happened with the Pine River Gas Plant - Sulphur Pipeline (as a result of burning no more than an estimated 107kg of sulphur) with respect to workers and residents could well happen in the County of Lamont; except that in the County of Lamont vastly larger number of people and livestock would be at risk.  The concerns expressed here don't involve idle or trivial threats.  In its answer to FAQ #32 HAZCO stated that "....Molten sulphur will be received by one of three methods, pipeline, rail tank car or truck. " That is what HAZCO stated in writing.  Verbally, HAZCO repeatedly stated that all three methods for transporting sulphur to the proposed site would be used.

"The B.C. Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks approved an application from Shell Canada Ltd. and Amoco Canada Petroleum Co. for the construction of a long-term sulphur blocking facility near the new Pine River expansion plant."

In November 1994, Westcoast Energy Inc. completed its $300 million expansion at the Pine River gas processing plant; the expansion doubled the plant’s sulphur capacity from 1080 t/d to 2000 t/d. Westcoast will also complete three other projects in northeastern British Columbia between 1995 and 1997: (1) the $673 million Grizzly Valley Expansion project, which calls for a new gas gathering and processing plant at Chetwynd-Tumbler Ridge with a sulphur recovery capacity of 1600 t/d, to be completed by late 1997; (2) a $266 million expansion near Fort St. John involving the construction of a new gas plant at Beg-Jedney near Aitken Creek with a sulphur capacity of 200 t/d, to be completed by late 1995; and (3) a $55 million debottlenecking project at the Fort St. John/McMahon gas plant, which is expected to increase raw gas throughput by 14%, starting in 1995.

The B.C. Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks approved an application from Shell Canada Ltd. and Amoco Canada Petroleum Co. for the construction of a long-term sulphur blocking facility near the new Pine River expansion plant. The construction of the 500,000-t basepad was completed in the fall. Its design was based on Shell’s facility at Shantz, Alberta. (Sulphur, by Michel Prud’homme, Natural Resources Canada, CANADIAN MINERALS YEARBOOK, 1994, p. 3)

The Dec. 4, 2002 sulphur-train derailment and fire near Medicine Hat.

The landowners at the site of the derailment report that:

  1. The derailment happened at about 1 am.  Notification to evacuate was given at about 4 am.  The landowners asked the RCMP whether they would have time to evacuate their horses.  The RCMP said there was not time for that, as of that time nothing much was known about the risks involved with the derailment and fire, e.g. what it was that was burning.
  2. As the landowners' family members left their home, they could feel the burning of acid rain that fell on their skin (that would have to have been the water vapour from the fire-fighting operation that condensed and formed, combining with the SO2 released from the fire, into sulphuric acid].  Overhead, the wife said, there was a bluish cloud of gas.
  3. The fire was put out a few hours later, and the landowners and the members of their family returned to their property in the afternoon on the day of the derailment.
  4. Subsequently, although the initial fire had been put out, additional fires broke out repeatedly for a period of six weeks.  The reason for that was, as per the landowners, that all 42 of the derailed rail cars had to be ripped apart, to spill the sulphur (liquid as well as solidified sulphur) onto the adjacent land and into the adjacent irrigation canal, as there was no method or place available for the disposal of the sulphur contained in the cars [where did the sulphur eventually go?].  The work associated with that caused the additional fires. [As per the TSB derailment report, the Seven Persons fire department stood by for the duration of the 6-week salvage operation to put out any fires that happened to be started during the necessary work.]  However, as the landowners report, often when HAZCO employees went home at night to resume work the next morning, they had to call HAZCO to tell them that sulphur at the site had begun to burn once more.  Upon being notified, HAZCO employees would return and extinguish the new sulphur fires that had erupted in their absence.
  5. At the site of the derailment many pieces of sulphur that had been scattered are visible.  Moreover, nothing grows there now.  However, gophers are digging there, and the earth that is being brought up by the gophers clearly contains sulphur.  [We looked for that during our Mar 25 visit to the site but could not find any instances of gopher hills.]  That is understandable, as the liquid sulphur had covered the ground in places to a considerable depth and had become mixed with the soil.   [See photo, above.]  Sulphur is difficult to remove from soil mechanically.  To clean up the sulphur-contaminated soil, all of the soil would have had to be removed to the depth it had been disturbed and become mixed with sulphur.  Uncontaminated soil would have had to be brought in to replace the soil that had been removed.  Apparently HAZCO, who were to perform the site reclamation, did that, but it is incongruous that so many pieces of sulphur are still evident at the derailment site.]
  6. An irrigation canal affected by the derailment has been restored.  However, in accordance with the landowners' concerns and true to their predictions at the time [also verified during our Mar. 25, 2006 visit to the site], no vegetation grows on the bottom of the restored irrigation canal.  Therefore the canal is suffering now from water erosion.  It appears that the elevation of the bottom of the irrigation canal at that location is now somewhat lower than the preceding and subsequent portion of the irrigation canal that had not been disturbed.
  7. At the start of the header irrigation ditch that leads away from the irrigation gate at the irrigation canal, a culvert, covered with dirt, had been placed by HAZCO into the header ditch to permit salvage and repair vehicles to cross the ditch.  The culvert is still there in the header ditch.  That culvert now obstructs the flow of irrigation water to the field served by the header ditch.  That problem is caused by the culvert being slightly too small, with its end having been bent partially shut, and by the culvert being elevated at one end.  In consequence, one of the landowners stated, it is no longer possible to irrigate their land properly by gravity flow.
  8. Hazco had been contracted by either CPR or Alberta Environment to effect the restoration of the derailment site.  Don Friesen, the COE of HAZCO, had promised to the landowners that the affected land was to be in as good or better condition after completion of that work as it was before the derailment happened.  In the landowners' opinion, Don Friesen of HAZCO broke his promise, and HAZCO simply abandoned their restoration work before it was completed, leaving the affected land in deplorable condition.
       We can attest to that.  When we visited the derailment site it was obvious that, although the horses had grazed well right up to the portion of the land onto which the sulphur had been spilled, the sparse vegetation on the affected portion of the land (about thee acres) is not being touched by the horses.  Perhaps that is due to taste preferences, perhaps it is merely horse sense.  Still, it is obvious that the soil there contains many pieces of sulphur.  As the ground was frozen at the time of our visit, it was not possible to tell whether only sulphur pieces at the surface are being involved or whether more sulphur is mixed into the soil at lower depths.  There must be some reason why the bottom of the irrigation canal at the derailment site does not permit vegetation to grow.
       Aside from that, a portion of the "restored" land now contains one area that retains run-off water.  The resulting water-logging of the soil at that location prevents growth of desirable vegetation, while some weeds grow there sparsely.
  9. Alberta Environment has been less than helpful in helping the landowners with their concerns.  If any reports were produced by Alberta Environment or by anyone else, none of those reports have been made available to the landowners.  The landowners stated that three years after the derailment the TSB derailment report was not yet available on the Internet, and that the report had been posted only upon their insistence.
  10. On account of the sulphur train derailment and subsequent sulphur fires on their land, the landowners lost the stallion of their horse breeding operation. The stallion, a national halter champion , was worth an estimated $40,000 to $50,000.  The stallion had not been evacuated during the initial fire and evacuation.  However, when subsequently sulphur fires continued to break out and burn, the landowners moved their stallion to an ice arena in the vicinity.  No compensation has been paid to them for any expenses incurred with that or for the loss of the stallion.  CPR authorities tell them that CPR has no obligation to pay anything in compensation for the relocation of the horse, as the animal was moved during a time when no evacuation order was in place.
  11. It appears that an evacuation order should have been in place for the duration of the clean-up operations by HAZCO.  During the six-week aftermath of the derailment and while sulphur fires continued to develop, the landowners' son began to suffer from frequent and severe nosebleeds that occur until now, although now with somewhat lesser frequency.
  12. The site of the derailment is about eight miles south-west from Medicine Hat.
  13. A neighbour of the landowners appears to have settled for an undisclosed amount of compensation.  However, as far as the landowners know, that is the only settlement that has taken place.  They have been to court to attempt to obtain a settlement, but it appears now that a Class II environmental impact assessment study will have to be done to substantiate the assertions by the landowners.  The landowners estimate that the costs of that and continued involvement by lawyers will set them back by an additional $20,000.
  14. Reports of the derailment were not published in the media, except for accounts in two local newspapers.

Back to Index for sulphur-storage web pages

Back to Bruderheim Main Page

Posted July 23, 2005
Updates:
2006 02 24 (added information on sulphur pipeline fires)
2006 03 12 (added more information on fires at Pine River gas plant sulphur pipeline)
2006 03 24 (added information about the sulphur train derailment and fire near Medicine Hat)
2006 03 26 (added information gathered during our 2006 03 25 visit to the site of the sulphur train derailment and fire near Medicine Hat)